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Peter Jackson
Department of History School of Humanities, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK
ABSTRACT
During the First World War, France and Britain forged the most
intimate and comprehensive political, economic, and military
alliance in history. The contributions of Britain and its Empire
had been vital to France’s survival as a Great Power.
A continuation of the wartime Entente was therefore pivotal
to a wider strategy of embedding French security in a trans-
Atlantic community of democratic Powers including the United
States. But neither Britain nor the United States were ready to
commit to using force to uphold the European order estab-
lished at Paris. British political and policy elites reverted to pre-
war cultural reflexes that prioritised Imperial considerations
and assumed that France posed the chief threat to British
interests.
The bitter experience of the Great War drove home the vital strategic
importance of Britain to France. The manpower, maritime strength, indus-
trial production, and raw materials of Britain, its Empire, and Dominions
had been pivotal to victory in 1918. Paris judged British power vital to all
projects to contain Germany after the fighting ceased. For this reason,
continuing some form of the wartime alliance with Britain remained an
absolute necessity in all French planning for peace after 1918.1 The great
challenge for the French was that British policy makers did not share this
vision. British elite and popular opinion opposed the idea of future military
interventions on the continent. British post-war priorities were instead
Imperial consolidation and European economic and political recovery, the
latter aim presuming the relatively swift re-integration of Germany into the
international economy. Another important factor was a current of
“Atlanticism” in British policy during the Peace Conference. This was
based in part on cultural affinities between Britain and the United States,
the world’s two English-speaking Great Powers. But it rested more funda-
mentally on a widely shared conviction that Britain’s interests were best
served by close co-operation with President Woodrow Wilson’s
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Administration.2 A traditional military alliance with France was not compa-
tible with British conceptions of post-war international order.
Military alliances of the pre-1914 variety also ran against increasingly
powerful international norms that favoured multilateral and internationalist
responses to the problems of peace and security. Traditional power politics
had been widely—although by no means universally—discredited in the
international public sphere. Enormously popular with the French public,
Wilson’s call for “a new and more wholesome diplomacy” and creating
a “universal association of nations” reached an unprecedented global
audience.3 The death and destruction wrought by the war created a fertile
environment for internationalist ideas in general and Wilson’s public calls for
a new approach to world politics in particular. French policy at the Peace
Conference was an adaptation of traditional security priorities to the realities
of the post-war international environment. As a traditional bi-lateral alliance
with Britain and America was not available, the government of Georges
Clemenceau pursued a trans-Atlantic post-war international order. At its
heart would be close co-operation amongst the world’s three most powerful
democracies: France, Britain, and the United States.
This process of adaptation has not received the attention it deserves in the
existing literature. English-language historiography has long tended to inter-
pret French policy as having been based on pre-1914 practices of the balance
of power and exclusive alliances. The earliest articulation of this view
emerged before the ink dried on the Treaty of Versailles. In what remains
the most influential book ever written about the Peace Conference, John
Maynard Keynes depicted Clemenceau as a “French Bismarck.”4 French
policy, he argued, aimed at destroying German power and constructing old-
fashioned alliances with Britain and other Powers to keep Germany down.
Keynes’s judgements have played a central role in shaping the English-
language literature on the Conference ever since.5 French historians have
tended to offer more nuanced interpretations alive to the ideological dimen-
sion to French policy in 1919.6 Nevertheless, the trans-Atlantic conception
underpinning the Clemenceau government’s approach does not figure pro-
minently even in the most recent literature. A close look at the evolution of
policy deliberations in Paris, and in particular the role of Britain in those
deliberations, provides a new perspective on peace making and the dynamics
of Franco-British relations at this crucial juncture.
I
The importance of Britain, its Empire, and Dominions to France’s war
effort had grown steadily over the course of the Great War. During the
opening phase, the British Expeditionary Force played a pivotal role in
turning the initial German attack into northern France. In the months that
followed, the scale of Britain’s military commitment increased dramatically
from just over 900,000 in late 1915 to nearly 1.4 million one year later and
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over 1.8 million by autumn 1917.7 Just as significant was the contribution of
British sea power. The Royal Navy contained the German High Seas Fleet,
protected shipping lanes vital to the Allied war effort, and imposed an ever-
more-suffocating blockade on the Central Powers. France depended on the
British merchant marine for more than one-half of the imports required to
maintain war production and feed its population.8 Britain’s position as the
world’s leading creditor was vital in securing foreign loans necessary to
sustain its war effort: By late 1916, having contracted a debt of 7.8 billion
francs to Britain, France was almost completely dependent on British credit
to finance increasingly vast war purchases in the United States.9
British power was indispensable to France’s ability to wage the Great War.
It is impossible, however, to disentangle the importance attached by French
officials to Britain from that they attributed to the United States. This is
particularly true in the economic realm. France contracted huge war loans in
America, mainly via the British Treasury. After entering the war, the
Americans contributed vast resources to a range of inter-Allied institutions
established to co-ordinate the Allied economic war effort: the Allied Wheat
Executive, Inter-Allied Supplies Council, and Inter-Allied Maritime
Transport Council. Allied pooled shipping and the distribution of raw
materials, foodstuffs, and industrial production was rationalised in an
increasingly effective system of economic co-ordination.10 The structure
and activities of these trans-Atlantic institutions provided a model for
French planning for post-war economic security.
Imperial Russia’s collapse in 1917 only compounded French dependence on
Britain and the United States. Since its inception in 1894, the Franco-Russian
Alliance had provided French policy with a traditional “eastern counter-weight”
to German power. It forced Germany to wage a two-front war after 1914 and
thereafter provided French policy with a measure of independence from Britain.
The fall of the tsar and the advent of the Bolshevik regime in 1917 deprived
France of this important source of strategic and diplomatic support. Planning
was underway to replace the Russian alliance with close partnerships with
“Successor States” in Central-Eastern Europe, but virtually all officials involved
recognised that any “eastern system” could not supplant Imperial Russia in the
European balance of power.11
British support for French security on the continent was therefore central
to every post-war plan elaborated by French policy makers after 1918. But
there were formidable cultural and political obstacles to a close post-war
relationship. Long centuries of imperial and continental rivalry weighed
heavily on mutual Franco-British perceptions. Subjective constructions of
the past and stereotypes concerning national character lay at the heart of
these perceptions. French political and policy elites tended to attribute the
qualities of cynicism, selfishness, insularity, and materialism to Britain’s
national character. British international policy was widely represented as
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motivated by self-interest and material gain.12 These national qualities were
typically juxtaposed with the selfless principles and universal ideals under-
pinning France’s role in the world. The nineteenth-century French historian,
Jules Michelet, characterised Britain as “anti-France” and the political, moral,
and cultural “negation” of all that gave French character its “grandeur.”13
Negative French constructions of Britain’s character were mirrored in
interesting ways across the Channel. Dominant British images of the
French were of a frivolous, corrupt, unstable, and untrustworthy people.14
Some historians have argued that a “British” identity first emerged as
a galvanising force within the context of Britain’s global struggle with
France during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.15 Stereotypes
based on perceived differences in national character were perhaps most
powerful in the Imperial context. The British army officer, Mark Sykes,
who negotiated a colonial agreement with the French, judged French officers
and administrators “incapable of commanding respect” because “they are not
sahibs, they have no gentlemen, the officers have no horses, or guns, or
dogs.”16
One of the most persistent and powerful tropes on both sides of the
Channel was that of a “natural rivalry,” making long-term co-operation all
but impossible. The legacy of enmity between France and Britain has shaped
perceptions and policy making for centuries. Before the Battle of Trafalgar in
1805, Napoleon Bonaparte closed a missive to the French naval commander
by appealing to his “hatred for that power that has been oppressing us for
forty generations.”17 Nearly a century later, even as relations gradually
improved, leading to the signature of the Entente Cordiale, British Prime
Minister Lord Salisbury hoped for “at best a mutual temper of apathetic
tolerance” between two Powers that were “not naturally inclined to live
together peaceably.”18
During the Great War, Britain and France were able to put aside legacies
of rivalry to co-ordinate their war efforts. The result was a remarkable
strategic partnership that culminated in forging extensive and intimate intel-
ligence-sharing arrangements, creating a unified command in spring 1918
and victory the following November.19 Yet, with the Armistice barely signed,
soon-to-be foreign secretary Lord Curzon could observe to the Cabinet:
We have been brought, for reasons of national safety, into an alliance with the
French, but history shows that their national character is different from ours… .
I am afraid that the Great Power from whom we most have to fear in the future is
France.20
The permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office, Lord Hardinge, echoed
this assessment some months later. “It must be remembered,” he warned:
until a century ago, France was England’s historic and natural enemy, and that real
friendship between the inhabitants of the two countries has always been very
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difficult owing to differences of language, mentality and national character. These
differences are not likely to decrease.21
Subjective constructions of the past weighed heavily on British understand-
ings and anticipations in 1919. Four and one-half years of common struggle
had not erased centuries of national and imperial rivalry.
Policy making in both London and Paris was shaped by the normative
environment in which it took place. Two increasingly influential norms
played an important role in shaping British policy prescriptions at the close
of the war. Often referred to nowadays as “self-determination,” the first was
more often described at the time as “the nationality principle.” A widely
circulated Foreign Office memorandum on the question of “peace terms:
observed that, “No peace can be satisfactory to this country unless it pro-
mises to be durable, and an essential condition of such a peace is that it
should give full scope to national aspirations as far as practicable.”22 The
principle of self-determination was inseparable from the broader norm of
democracy promotion. If British—and French—officials were more reluctant
than their American counterparts to link explicitly self-determination and
democracy, they did not deny the connexion between them. A second influ-
ential norm was support for constructing an international organisation to
promote peace and co-operation amongst states. This support increased
steadily over the course of the war within civil society as well as amongst
political elites.23
Imperial priorities were equally fundamental in shaping British perspec-
tives on the post-war order. After 1914, consensus existed amongst British
policy elites about destroying German naval power so that it could no longer
pose any threat to Britain’s global interests. The government of David Lloyd
George focused increasingly on acquiring former Ottoman and German
colonies and obtaining conditions under which the Royal Navy could best
ensure the security of the British Empire.24 There was no enthusiasm in
Britain for ambitious territorial adjustments aimed at transforming the
European balance. An outline of British “peace terms” by two senior
Foreign Office officials in 1916 recommended that Britain resist “any attempt
on the part of France to incorporate any considerable extent of German
territory on the plea of strategical exigencies.”25
The British had taken part in Allied planning to create anti-German post-
war trading blocs at the Allied Economic Conference in London in 1916.
Lloyd George had also promised that the peace settlement would force
Germany to pay for the costs of the war and prevent it from damaging
British industry by dumping cheap manufactures on the British market. Still,
Germany had been Britain’s second-largest trading partner before 1914, and
by late 1918, British policy makers leaned increasingly towards a strategy of
re-integrating Germany into the world economy as quickly as possible to
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stimulate European and especially British recovery.26 This strategy comple-
mented the increasing priority attributed to Anglo-American co-operation in
British policy. Wilson had stated clearly that a swift return to pre-war free
trade practices was the best means to restore the world economy after the
vagaries of the Great War.27 British officials in London and Washington
liaised ever more closely with their American counterparts over questions of
post-war political and economic order during the second half of 1918. An
American envoy sent to Europe in 1918 to study Allied peace preparations
received a warm welcome in London and met with a wide range of British
officials involved in peace planning in a trend that would broaden and
deepen in the weeks to come. He was surprised, however, that similar co-
operation did not seem to be taking place between the British and French. He
observed instead “a noticeable attitude of suspicion and even distrust
between London and Paris regarding preparations for the eventual peace.”28
French responses to the post-war normative environment differed from
British responses in important ways. Support for a League or “Society” of
Nations was more limited in France and concentrated on the left of the
French political spectrum.29 Policy elites expressed frustration with their
counterparts across the Channel. General Victor Hugeut, the chief French
liaison officer to the British army during the war, lamented “profound
insularity” in the British people and their “splendid and tranquil
selfishness.”30 Paul Cambon, who by 1919 had served as France’s ambassador
at London for 20 years, criticised what he saw as the persistent short-
sightedness of Britain’s international policy: “It is childish to make long-
range policy,” he complained, “with people who dislike hypotheses and live
only for the present.”31 Cambon had long lamented the “lack of foresight, the
true characteristic of [the British] people.”32 Nevertheless, discussion of
France’s security priorities remained focused firmly on the continent. The
legacies of past imperial rivalry did not alter convictions that France required
a close relationship with Britain. Much less inclined than their British
counterparts to invoke history as a guide to future Franco-British relations,
French policy makers aimed instead to integrate British power into a French
conception of a new European and international order. This conception
would prove flexible enough to adapt to British policy requirements.
II
Premier Clemenceau made all of the key decisions concerning France’s
negotiating strategy in close consultation with a small team of trusted
collaborators that included the industrialist, Louis Loucheur, Georges
Mandel, and André Tardieu. Parliament and leading political figures, includ-
ing President Raymond Poincaré, found themselves marginalised from deci-
sion making and only advised on the state of negotiations sporadically. Even
Clemenceau’s Cabinet remained at arm’s length from key deliberations.33
The most influential of Clemenceau’s inner circle was the journalist,
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politician, former diplomat, and soldier, Tardieu. After volunteering in 1914,
he saw frontline service before appointment to General—later Marshal—
Ferdinand Foch’s staff. In 1917, he became France’s high commissioner to
New York after America entered the war as an “Associated Power.” In this
capacity, he reported directly to the premier. Like Clemenceau, Tardieu
spoke English fluently and possessed an extensive network of contacts in
both Britain and America.34 He returned from his American posting con-
vinced that France’s best hope for future security was a close relationship
with the “Anglo-Saxon” Powers. In early December, Clemenceau tasked him
with bringing together the policy recommendations of various policy actors
into a coherent peace programme. Consulting closely with the premier,
Tardieu drew on the material gathered from the Foreign Ministry, the
army and naval general staffs, the civilian Comité d’études, and informal
contacts amongst industrialists and civil society more broadly.35
Three other figures were influential in developing French security policy at
the Peace Conference. Since mid-1917, the commerce minister, Étienne
Clémentel, had worked with his advisor, Henri Hauser, to develop a post-
war economic and commercial strategy based on close co-operation amongst
the three liberal Great Powers. Clémentel’s vision of future economic security
extended well beyond the realm of commerce to embrace questions of war
debts and reparations. His voice was prominent during the early phase of
conference preparations. As negotiations evolved, Loucheur’s influence
replaced that of Clémentel.36 Philippe Berthelot was the most influential
permanent official within the Foreign Ministry. A long-time figure within
the Quai d’Orsay’s central administration, he combined a formidable intel-
lect, an enormous capacity for hard work, and a dominant personality.
Berthelot had earned the trust of Clemenceau’s foreign minister, Stephen
Pichon, during the latter’s first term at the Quai d’Orsay in 1906–1907. After
the Armistice, the two worked together closely to overcome Clemenceau’s
legendary mistrust of the Foreign Ministry. British statesmen considered
Berthelot anti-British, whilst German observers accused him of hatred of
Germany. Both assessments were wide of the mark. Berthelot was
a consistent proponent of the Franco-British entente and a relatively early
convert to a policy of cautious rapprochement with Germany. His over-
arching priority was the pursuit of France’s interests.37
Another important but less well-known figure in French policy making
was Louis Aubert. A historian by training, Aubert had served as director of
Tardieu’s Service d’études et d’information at the French High Commission in
New York. He returned to Paris with Tardieu after the Armistice, serving as
his secretary and chief of staff during and after the Peace Conference. He
participated in drafting a large number of key memoranda, particularly
concerning territorial questions. In this capacity, Aubert insisted repeatedly
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on the need to frame French arguments in a way to guarantee Anglo-
American support. Warning that arguments based on history and sentiment
were unlikely to convince France’s allies, he argued instead for a forward-
looking policy that aimed at “the construction of a new international
system.”38
Clemenceau, however, retained the final word on virtually every important
question.39 Although famous for his pessimistic pronouncements on human
nature, democracy, civil liberties, and secular values were consistent themes of
his long career in French politics. Clemenceau was of the generation of 1871.
He had lived through defeat and the Commune and believed that recovery of
the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine was the responsibility of every French
citizen. These democratic and patriotic convictions made the “Tiger”
a ferocious critic of autocracy and an implacable enemy of Imperial
Germany. Moreover, with his fluent English, Clemenceau possessed an exten-
sive network of friends and political contacts across the Channel. No narrow-
minded French nationalist, he had long been a committed proponent of good
relations with Britain and was convinced that Anglo-American support
remained the most fundamental of France’s peace aims.40
Clemenceau made this clear in a rare speech on the subject of peace
making delivered before the Chamber of Deputies on 29 December 1918—
it followed an intervention in which Pichon made fourteen references to the
crucial importance of Allied unity for the security of France.41 Whilst prais-
ing the value of “solid and well-defended frontiers, armaments and some-
thing called a balance of powers,” he also stressed the need to “alter the
sentiments that prevailed before the war” and build “a new edifice” for the
international system.42 Declaring that he had formulated a list of demands
that his government would pose during peace negotiations, Clemenceau
warned, “some of them I can and perhaps must sacrifice to a larger interest.”
And he was clear about the nature of this larger interest: “Accord with our
Allies brought us victory and it is this accord that will also deliver peace and
justice to the world in the years to come.” He referred repeatedly to the need
to prolong the wartime coalition in peacetime. “If we do not arrive at an
accord with our Allies, our victory will have been in vain.” The peacetime
unity of the wartime partners would therefore serve as his “directing
thought.” “To this unity” he declared “I will make every sacrifice.”43
Clemenceau would hold true to his word.
III
From the outbreak of war, security from future German aggression had
dominated public and official discourse in France. A recurrent theme in both
realms was the need to go further than merely reclaiming Alsace-Lorraine.
To ensure its long-term security, France must detach the territory on the left
bank of the Rhine River from the rest of Germany; stretching west of the
Rhine from the Netherlands in the north to the Saar coal basin in the south,
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it was a traditional highway for invasions both eastward and westward.
Denying Germany the right to use the Left Bank as a staging ground for
yet another attack on France was an undisputed priority for French policy
makers. This, the argument went, would provide France with a vital strategic
buffer.44 Advocates of this solution drew on a much older discourse of
France’s “natural frontiers,” the origins of which traced to the late Middle
Ages.45 Embedded in the Armistice conditions demanded by French officials
in late October and early November 1918 were designs to alter the
Rhineland’s political status. These included control of key strategic bridge-
heads, the military occupation of the Left Bank, and the creation of a 40
kilometre-wide demilitarised zone on the east bank of the river.46 In the
weeks that followed, the French policy machine set to work drafting a series
of memoranda to inform peace negotiations. The question of France’s eastern
frontier with Germany was central to all prescriptions for future security.
Tardieu described the future political and military status of this region as
“the essential problem which dominates all others in our preparations.”47
The Quai d’Orsay took the lead. Gabriel Hanotaux, the diplomat, histor-
ian, and former foreign minister, called for a “grand peace” of “European
organisation.” He meant in effect breaking up Germany: detaching the Left
Bank and occupying German territory “to the line of the Elbe River.” Most of
the Left Bank would fall to France, including Luxemburg. Reconstituted
Germany would become a loose federation of states, each with its own
legislature and foreign policy.48 Most French diplomats favoured a less
radical solution. Jules Laroche, a rising star within the Foreign Ministry’s
political directorate, advocated neutralising the Left Bank, arguing to deny
Germany “all of the military attributes of sovereignty on the Left Bank,”
which would be subject to a permanent inter-Allied military occupation. He
added that France must insist on privileged commercial relations with the
Left Bank. This, he judged, would establish the conditions “for its eventual
political detachment from Germany.”49 Laroche’s proposal provided a means
of adapting the principle of “self-determination” to French aims to dominate
the Rhineland. Berthelot in Paris and Cambon in London endorsed this
“gradual” project for detaching the Left Bank from the rest of Germany.50
In early December, Berthelot came out against annexation or any unilateral
alteration of the political status of the Left Bank. He advocated instead
a sustained effort to convince the Rhinelanders over time that their political
future lay with France.51 Tardieu endorsed this strategy, judging that the
“creation of a different economic orientation” on the Left Bank would
produce “the eventual conditions for a political reorientation.”52
Foch was a prominent voice in policy discussions concerning the German
frontier. From the moment fighting ceased, his staff produced a barrage of
detailed memoranda emphasising the strategic importance of the Rhine as
well as the distinct ethnic make-up and political views of the Rhinelander
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population.53 France could no longer count on Russia to provide an eastern
counterweight to Germany. The logical solution was therefore to create one
or more independent Rhenish states tied politically to France and its allies.
Only such a grouping could provide “the natural barrier of the Rhine” that
Foch argued was a fundamental condition for future European peace and
security.54 One notable aspect of these early Rhineland memoranda is the
striking absence of any reference to either America or Britain. French
officials seem to have assumed that France’s Great Power allies would
acquiesce in their projects for territorial revision if Paris gave lip service to
the principle of self-determination. As Clemenceau, Tardieu, and Aubert
warned, however, this assumption was to prove unfounded.
Britain was far from absent, conversely, in the policy prescriptions of the
French Embassy in London. A traditionalist, Cambon placed great impor-
tance on the value of the balance of power and military alliances. He was
openly contemptuous of the ideas of Wilson, whom he considered “incapable
of understanding the complexity of European problems” and judged “a grave
threat to France.” He argued forcefully that France could only achieve its core
security objectives if it proceeded in close agreement with Britain. Cambon
did great harm to this cause, however. When meeting with the foreign
secretary, Arthur Balfour, he predicted that the future would witness
a titanic global struggle pitting Britain and France, on one hand, and an
alliance of Germany and America, on the other. For his part, Balfour
considered Cambon’s ideas to be “little short of insanity.”55 The ambassa-
dor’s apocalyptic imaginings only strengthened existing British predisposi-
tions toward co-operation with America.
Linked to plans to detach the Rhineland were ambitions to secure access to
needed energy sources to expand France’s industrial base at Germany’s
expense. The return of Lorraine, along with Luxemburg’s economic inde-
pendence, deprived Germany of 80 percent of its pre-war iron ore reserves
and 36 percent of its steel production.56 Pre-war France had been a net
importer of coal, but Alsace-Lorraine would not improve France’s coal
deficit. The Quai d’Orsay estimated that France would still need to import
nearly 40 percent of its coal and nearly 65 percent of metallurgical coke
required for steel production.57 The wholesale destruction of many French
mines by the German army as it withdrew from northern France in 1918
exacerbated the situation. These considerations underpinned the French case
to annex the Saar coal basin. They were also central to France’s successful
demand for annual deliveries from Germany of 20 million tonnes of coal
per year, up to three-quarters of which was to be high-grade coking coal.58
These arrangements would weaken Germany. French control of the Saar
coalfield, combined with the anticipated cession of much of Upper Silesia to
Poland, would reduce Germany’s coal production by nearly one-half. They
would also secure greater independence for France from Britain. Berthelot
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stressed that as the war ended, France found itself in a situation “of unacceptable
dependence” on British coal and coke. The post-war energy policy devised by the
Quai d’Orsay and Ministry of Commerce would end this dependence whilst
opening the way for a renaissance in French steel production.59
Plans to transform France’s steel industry were part of a wider policy for
economic recovery and security. The driving force behind this policy was the
Commerce Ministry under Clémentel, which had developed a thoroughly
trans-Atlantic vision of post-war economic order. The overall objective was
to ensure French economic recovery and meet the challenge posed by future
competition with the much larger German economy. The short-term aim was
to organise a preferential system of trade to ensure French access to the
markets, raw materials, and foodstuffs required for France’s recovery. Central
to this system was an inter-Allied consortium for controlling the price of raw
materials as well as transport costs.60 The long-term aim was to construct an
“Atlantic Economic Union” including the United States and Britain. Within
this union, access to raw materials would provide “an economic weapon” to
“constrain German industry to collaborate peacefully with other nations.”61
At the heart of French policy was a conception of economic security based on
trans-Atlantic co-operation.
These proposals served as the basis for amore detailed programme that became
France’s initial policy for future economic order at the Peace Conference. This
programme went further by advocating the construction of an
Atlantic commercial consortium dominated by the victorious democracies but
operating under the aegis of the League of Nations. It also advocated imposing
a discriminatory commercial regime to remain in place through the years of
France’s reconstruction. The Allied Powers would collaborate in the “rational
distribution” of raw materials at fixed prices and establish a regime of pooled
transport at set costs. Such a system would constitute a “durable cement” to “bind
the British Empire and the US to France” in a post-war “economic alliance.”62
The envisaged “Democratic Economic Union” would be part of the insti-
tutional machinery of the yet-to-be-created new international organisation.63
Excluded in the first instance from these arrangements, Germany would gain
admission only after demonstrating its commitment to international co-
operation. Thereafter the trans-Atlantic regime would provide “an effective
means of recalling to Germany the need to respect its obligations as
a civilised power.”64 “We have no wish to ruin [Germany],” Clémentel
insisted. Revenge was counterproductive to the need to restore France.
Nevertheless, Germany must provide “evidence that it has embraced concep-
tions similar to those of the community of free nations.” When it did so, the
punitive commercial regime would end.65 Crucially, however, this vision of a
trans-Atlantic post-war economic community was based on the assumption
of full British and American participation.
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French officials were aware that there would be opposition to their pro-
gramme in Britain and especially the United States. To exert pressure on the
British and Americans to embrace its approach, Clemenceau’s government
linked reparations to a post-war trade regime. In internal conversations,
Commerce Ministry officials were sceptical that large reparations payments
from Germany were either wise or feasible. Large cash transfers would drive up
inflation, whilst reparation “in kind” would flood the French market with
German exports and threaten France’s economic recovery.66 To make virtue
of necessity, the Ministry proposed a multilateral alternative. The Central
Powers would accept liability for the total costs of the war, but taking their
capacity to pay into account, the expectation was that they would in reality pay
a considerably smaller sum in annuities over 25 years. A “worldwide pool” to
which all Powers would contribute would cover the remaining costs of recon-
struction. Britain would be a net contributor to this fund.67 Clémentel there-
fore urged the Clemenceau government to insist that accepting relatively
modest reparations from Germany, France would require “commonly agreed
revision and reduction” of the war debts it owed Britain and America.68 In
a strategy inspired partly by thinking in some quarters of Whitehall, repara-
tions demands were to be used as leverage to obtain relief on war debts and
create a multilateral commercial and shipping regime to underpin French
economic recovery.69
The Commerce Ministry’s programme, endorsed by Clemenceau in
September 1918, envisaged in effect a mutualisation of the costs of the war
and reconstruction. It proposed a forward-looking solution to the challenge
of restoring the European economy that in many ways anticipated the
strategy adopted after 1945.70 Given British commitments to post-war com-
mercial co-operation made during the war, especially at the Allied Economic
Conference in 1916, the anticipation was that Lloyd George’s government
would lend its support to this bid for a trans-Atlantic economic system for
post-war reconstruction.71
Britain was also central to French plans for a “society of nations.” In
June 1917, the wartime government of Alexandre Ribot was the first amongst
the major Powers to appoint a committee to design a blueprint for an
international organisation. Calls for creating such an association reverberated
powerfully within the centre-left and left of the French political spectrum.
The resulting Commission interministérielle pour la Société des Nations
[CISDN] began meeting on 28 September 1917 and was much larger and
more active than the corresponding Phillimore Committee in Britain.72 It
met regularly through June 1918, when Clemenceau’s government received
its final report. Its meetings generated a large number of study papers,
proposals, and counter-proposals.73 The dominant voice within the CISDN
was undoubtedly that of its chair, Léon Bourgeois. A career politician, former
premier and foreign minister, Bourgeois had been France’s most prominent
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advocate of a “society” of nations for more than a decade. His vision was that
of an association of “civilised” states pursuing peace through the rule of
international law backed by the use of collective force.74 The programme
ultimately adopted by the CISDN was inspired in the main by internation-
alist concepts of world order. It envisaged a League of democratic states
organised to preserve peace by establishing and upholding the rule of inter-
national law. The central components of this organisation were a council
with executive authority, a permanent court of arbitration, a robust system of
legal, political, economic, and military sanctions, and a powerful interna-
tional force with a permanent command structure.75
The CISDN programme differed fundamentally from that put forward by
Phillimore’s Committee. The French proposal accepted that states would give
up a measure of sovereignty in return for collective security, an idea anath-
ema to the British vision of international organisation. The Phillimore Report
attributed considerable importance to arbitration as a means of settling
international disputes, but it did not propose the creation of a permanent
international court. Moreover, where the CISDN envisaged a permanent
council with the power to impose sanctions, the British conception referred
to a “conference of great powers” only to deliberate and recommend action
to member-states. Most significantly, there was no British equivalent of the
international military force advocated in the French proposal.76 The CISDN,
along with the rest of the Foreign Ministry, was well aware of the details of
the Phillimore Report and its differences.77 Yet Bourgeois and the interna-
tionalists on the Commission either did not realise, or were unconcerned,
that the French conception was likely to provoke robust objections from the
British. Indeed, it was doubtful that it would gain the unqualified support of
either the Quai d’Orsay or premier. Clemenceau was sceptical of the entire
project, privately mocking Bourgeois. The CISDN proposal, once submitted,
went to London and Washington without any commentary or supporting
covering text.78
British policy objectives were much less important to the evolution of
French policy towards the peace settlement in Eastern Europe. Territorial
revisions east of Germany were not a priority for Clemenceau—the issues at
stake required vast detailed knowledge of the region that only the Foreign
Ministry could provide. The Quai d’Orsay was thus able to assert its expertise
and dominate French policy towards the east. The unbelievable chaos in
revolutionary Russia made this policy uncertain. Faced with a lack of reliable
intelligence on events in the former Tsarist Empire, most French observers
remained convinced that the Bolsheviks were co-operating with Germany in
secret, an enduring conviction despite the evidence of the German revolution
in late 1918 and early 1919.79 France was the last Allied Power to abandon
the idea that military intervention could “liberate Russia from both the
German yoke and Bolshevik anarchy.”80 By late 1918 the British and
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American governments both refused to continue their intervention in Russia.
Combined with a mutiny in France’s Black Sea squadron, this fact compelled
a change of policy. French planning was quickly re-oriented towards the
inter-related aims of containing the spread of Bolshevism and constructing
an “eastern barrier” to future German expansion.
In mid-November 1918, Berthelot argued that the Allies must erect “a
cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism.”81 By mid-January, the political direc-
torate at the Quai d’Orsay recommended the construction of an “armed
barrage” east of the Reich based on Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
Romania.82 The creation of a bloc of “Successor States” in the east had
long been a current in French post-war planning. The army and naval
general staffs endorsed this strategy. Both also recommended creating
a viable South Slav state to help counter-balance Italian ambitions in the
region.83 Laroche stressed the historical roots of the strategy of an “eastern
counterweight” to Germanic power: “Since the reign of François I, France, in
need of security, has always searched for an alliance with the power situated
on the other side of Germany. But this power, for us, can now no longer be
Russia. It must today be Poland and Bohemia.”84
Two ad hoc committees of senior civil servants and soldiers produced
policy papers for the French Delegation. Both stressed the importance of
forging an “anti-German barrage” through the creation of a strong Romania,
a Czech-Slovak state with defensible frontiers, and a “greater Poland” with
access to the Baltic Sea and possession of Upper Silesian coalfields—which
had not been part of Poland since before the First Partition of that country in
1772.85 This imperative was to create strategically viable states immune to
Bolshevism and, concurrently, capable of serving as an “eastern barrier” to
Germany.86 Of all aspects of French policy at the Peace Conference, balance
of power considerations most shaped plans for Eastern Europe. They were
also least influenced by sensitivity to British requirements.
Britain and its Empire were pivotal, conversely, to French planning for the
extra-European Peace Settlement. During the war, the French and British had
arrogated to themselves the right to determine the fate of the imperial
territories of Germany and Turkey. The May 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement,
the result of five months of difficult wrangling between British and French
officials, had stipulated the creation of respective spheres of influence in the
former Ottoman Arab provinces outside the Arabian Peninsula. France
would have “such direct or indirect control as they desire” of present-day
Lebanon, the Syrian coastline, as well Cilicia and territory stretching to
Armenia. Britain would have similar control of Mesopotamia. The agreement
envisaged “an independent Arab state or Confederation” in the interior but
this region was divided into respective zones of British and French influence.
The French region stretched from Kirkuk and Mosul in the east to the coastal
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region of Syria. Palestine, meanwhile, would fall under “an international
administration.”87
The Sykes-Picot accord stood in contradiction to commitments to the
cause of Arab independence made by the British high commissioner in
Egypt to Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca. This pledge had been in
exchange for Hussein’s support for an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule. At
war’s end, Britain and France issued a joint declaration “concerning Syria
and Mesopotamia,” promising “the final liberation of those peoples who have
for so long been oppressed by the Turks” and support for “national govern-
ments and administrations deriving their authority from the free exercise of
the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.” However, the
declaration also expressed the French and British aim to “ensure by their
support and by adequate assistance the regular working of [regional] govern-
ments and administrations.”88 The two great European empires did not
intend to retreat from the region.
Franco-British negotiations over the Ottoman provinces took place in an
atmosphere of acrimony and mistrust that reflected a long history of imperial
rivalry. French colonialists remained deeply concerned by the activities of Arab
nationalists in Syria. The British army’s advance through Mesopotamia to take
Damascus in 1918 scarcely allayed these concerns. The British military admin-
istration “on the ground” did not acknowledge France’s “rights” granted under
the Sykes-Picot accord. Both sides denounced the cynicism and hypocrisy of the
other. François Georges-Picot, the French official charged with negotiating with
the British for the spoils of the Ottoman provinces, observed that the chief
British reflex in his dealings with them had been “deceive and dissemble.” Lord
Robert Cecil, an under-secretary at the ForeignOffice, warned Sykes, “[w]emust
never forget that, internationally, the French are a grasping people.”89 The one
thing that officials from both Powers agreed was the desirability of extending the
reach and influence of their respective empires.
France’s war effort had benefited significantly from the contributions of its
Empire. More than 550,000 colonial soldiers had been mobilised during the
war along with nearly 223,000 labourers for French war industries.90 Yet
colonial questions were not central in the preoccupations of Clemenceau and
his chief advisors. This gave permanent officials freedom to formulate policy
but carried the danger of their recommendations being ignored. Nor was the
French policy machine imperial in its outlook and reflexes in the manner of
the British government. The chief inspiration for the French colonial pro-
gramme came from a variety of civil society associations like the Société de
géographie, Comité de l’Afrique française, Comité de l’Asie française, and
Congrès français de la Syrie. These groupings counted significant numbers
of diplomats and soldiers amongst their memberships and received political
patronage from the Parti coloniale alliance in Parliament. They also provided
volunteers for two influential investigative commissions appointed by the
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wartime government of Aristide Briand to draw up recommendations for
France’s Imperial aims during peace negotiations.91
The programme that emerged approached the question of empire very
much in the manner of earlier peace conferences in Vienna (1814–1815)
and Berlin (1878). Imperial possessions were spoils for division amongst
the powerful. Wilson’s recommendation to take the views of colonial
subjects into account appeared unworkable given the level of “civilisation”
attributed to most colonised peoples. Colonial minister Henry Simon
observed that assuming control of German West Africa was “one of the
best guarantees of political and economic power for future generations.”92
With proposals for the former Ottoman territories based on implementing
Sykes-Picot, French planners remained committed to this traditional secret
imperial agreement even after it attracted widespread international criti-
cism when published by the Bolsheviks.93
Berthelot summarised the Foreign Ministry’s position on the future of
Ottoman territories in December 1918. He argued that the Ottoman Empire
had practiced the “periodic massacre of its subjects” and was “diametrically
opposed” to “the principles for which the Allies have fought.” It would
therefore need dismantling and reorganising into new political units of
some kind. Still, the liberated peoples were unready for full political inde-
pendence. They would require, instead, a long period of “European tutelage
and control.”94 Berthelot seems to have been unaware of the irony in this
judgement, coming from a European participant in the greatest slaughter in
the history of humanity. Whatever the case, British agreement and co-
operation was a pre-requisite in virtually all French plans for imperial
expansion.
IV
Early evidence of Clemenceau’s determination to proceed in close co-
operation with Britain emerged during Franco-British and Allied meetings
at the beginning of December 1918. The French premier had been shocked
by the way Wilson had undertaken unilateral negotiations with the Germans
prior to the Armistice. He therefore travelled to London to explore the
possibility of forging an understanding with Lloyd George’s government
that would present the American president with a united front on core
issues. Clemenceau’s aim was to offer concessions on extra-European issues
to gain British support for French plans for the Rhineland.95
This strategy was unsuccessful. Lloyd George’s government was by this
point leaning toward an “Atlanticist” orientation that placed priority on close
co-operation with America wherever possible.96 Foch met privately with Lloyd
George to outline French plans for neutralising the Left Bank. Lloyd George,
Balfour, and other British policy makers were non-committal at the formal
inter-Allied conference held on 3 December.97 Clemenceau met with Lloyd
George privately the previous day. At this meeting, he offered to abandon
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French claims to oil fields around Mosul as well as Palestine in exchange for
British support for French control of Syria, the coast of Lebanon, and France’s
designs for Germany’s western frontier. Clemenceau claimed the prime min-
ister accepted this bargain. Archival evidence suggests that it became the basis
for French planning.98 Lloyd George later denied having agreed to anything,
however, and said nothing of French demands in his brief to the Imperial War
Cabinet. The lack of formal minutes or written agreements caused a series of
violent confrontations in the months to come.99
The first issue over which French delegates found themselves in serious
disagreement with their British colleagues concerned the structure and char-
acter of the League. The existing literature on the League’s origins represents
the CISDN plan as a continuation of the wartime alliance in disguise.100 This
obscures important aspects of the story. Certainly, few French policy makers
viewed a future international organisation as a viable source of French
security. Most hoped that membership in such an organisation would help
bind France to Britain and the United States. But the French delegates on the
League Commission at the Peace Conference had very different understand-
ings of their role. Both Bourgeois and his deputy, Ferdinand Larnaude,
pursued the juridical vision of a “society of nations” at the heart of the
CISDN programme.101
Clemenceau gave little thought to the League, his public pronouncements
suggesting that the principal role of any post-war international organisation
must be to create a new moral order. When Wilson’s close advisor, Colonel
Edward House, met Clemenceau to convince him of the merits of an
American concept of the League as the engine for the moral transformation
of world politics, the premier feigned emotion and promised to support this
project.102 In reality, Clemenceau and Tardieu hoped to use concessions over
the League to obtain an American strategic commitment to western Europe.
It was not until 17 January that Clemenceau deigned to appoint Bourgeois as
head of the French Delegation to the League Commission.103 The fact was
that Clemenceau’s commitment to House had undermined Bourgeois’s role
and destroyed any prospects for the French plan. The premier advised
Bourgeois that this was part of a larger design. “Go down fighting,” he
exhorted Bourgeois. “Your failure will allow me to demand supplementary
guarantees on the Rhine.”104
There was little chance for the French League programme in any case. From
the outset, the British and American delegates on the League Commission
proceeded in lock step, united in their opposition to French ideas concerning
the nature of the organisation. When the Commission first convened on
3 February 1919, it became quickly apparent that the British and Americans
had been working together to produce a joint blueprint. The result was the
“Hurst-Miller” draft Covenant.105 The French Delegation knew nothing of this
collaboration—although American officials had approached Italian Premier
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Vitorrio Orlando to secure his advance support for the Anglo-American
conception.106 Bourgeois and Larnaude consequently found themselves iso-
lated when the Commission chair, Wilson, supported by Cecil as head of the
British Delegation, announced that the Hurst-Miller draft would serve as the
basis for all further discussion. The French delegates had not seen a prior draft
of the document. Nor were they able to present their own programme for
discussion—although minutes of the meeting, later doctored, suggested that
both France and Italy tabled proposals.107 Thereafter, forced to fight a lengthy
rear-guard action to insert as many elements of the French programme as
possible into the Covenant, the French delegates experienced only limited
success.
The French objected that the mechanisms for settling disputes in the
Anglo-American proposal were neither binding nor envisaged means for
the League to enforce its decisions. This was because the International
Court proposed in the Hurst-Miller draft would have limited jurisdiction
even over League members.108 The core difference between the French and
British plans was that for the French, the League should be a machine to keep
the peace through the imposition and enforcement of international law. For
the British, conversely, the League’s chief functions were to provide Anglo-
American international moral leadership and to protect the interests of the
British Empire.109 When Bourgeois or Larnaude pressed for a clear jurisdic-
tion for the International Court and procedures to decide on sanctions,
Wilson typically replied, the “court of world opinion” would provide
a more effective forum than any international legal regime “because it is
more powerful and can impose itself without technical subtleties.”110
Cecil and the British Delegation supported Wilson at every turn. When the
French called for establishing an international armed force, they met with
a common front opposed to this proposal as an unacceptable violation of
national sovereignty.111 The League Council that emerged from Commission
deliberations could only recommend measures to enforce its decisions. The
result was triumph for the Anglo-American conception of a League able to
exert moral pressure but lacking the capacity to impose binding sanctions
through its member-states. Powers committed to collective security would
spend much of the next fifteen years seeking ways to close the “gaps” in
Articles 10–16 of the Covenant, which laid out procedures for collective
action to impose the decisions of the League Council.112
Negotiations for the economic and financial settlement also foundered on
the shoals of Britain’s “Atlanticist” orientation at the Peace Conference. The
reparations settlement with Germany dominates the literature on economic
issues at the Conference. Yet from the French perspective, reparation was
one dimension of a larger project to recalibrate the world economy to
promote international co-operation based on trans-Atlantic co-ordination
of shipping and raw materials. The proposal presented by Clémentel in
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early February to the Economic Drafting Committee of the Conference called
for establishing a trans-Atlantic economic consortium dominated by the
victorious democracies.113 French negotiators anticipated opposition from
the Wilson administration. To overcome American misgivings, Clémentel
framed his “Plan” in ideologically charged terms and proposed to embed it
within the future League. Existing trans-Atlantic Allied co-operation would
expand and fall under the League’s auspices. Clémentel stressed ideological
bonds to cement a future “Democratic Union” and equip it to uphold a new
international order.114
Clémentel’s strategy failed completely. Wilson’s Administration remained
utterly opposed to “special economic combinations” and “any form of eco-
nomic boycott.”115 Clémentel responded with the prearranged strategy of
linking proposals for economic collaboration to reparations. He argued that,
if it could not count on economic collaboration with its wartime Allies,
France would have no choice but to demand “full reparations” from
Germany. This tactic failed to induce any change in the American position.
Wilson’s Administration remained firm in committing to a return to laissez-
faire liberal capitalism, decisively rejecting Clémentel’s plan for a trans-
Atlantic economic system. The result undermined Clémentel’s influence in
the Clemenceau government. By mid-February, Loucheur had assumed
effective control over financial negotiations.116
Throughout this phase of negotiations, British support for the French
position was conspicuous by its absence. British policy moved resolutely
away from post-war inter-Allied economic co-operation. Indeed, always
seeking tactical advantage, even at the expense of long-term considerations,
Lloyd George welcomed tension between the French and American delega-
tions. “The Americans … are becoming more and more anti-French,” he
advised his coalition partner, the Conservative leader, Andrew Bonar Law.
The Prime Minister judged that this was a positive development because “in
proportion to [the Americans'] increasing suspicion of the French is their
trust of the British.”117
Throughout the Peace Conference and afterward, French and British
negotiators disagreed over German reparations. Initially, the central issue
was the percentage to which each Power was entitled. The Armistice terms
had included France’s right to reparation for devastation suffered during the
war, the costs calculated at 64 billion gold marks. Britain, conversely, had
suffered crippling losses to its navy, merchant marine, and public finances.
Such losses were less apparent and harder to calculate than the costs of
French and Belgian reconstruction. French negotiators proposed a total bill
of 91 billion gold marks but indicated they would agree to a higher figure
provided they received at least 55 percent of the total sum.118 Lloyd George’s
government demanded that Britain receive at least one-quarter of the total
collected. When French negotiators refused to budge from 55 percent, the
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British insisted that war pensions must be included in the reparations
demanded of Germany, which drove calculations for its total liability to
astronomical sums over 200 billion gold marks.119 This allowed Loucheur
to assume a relatively moderate position in relation to that of British officials.
His chief priority became to secure agreement that Germany’s reparations
debt could be mobilised through the sale of bonds on international money
markets. Loucheur was intransigent only over the question of France’s
percentage.120
Still, negotiations concerning Germany’s liability were divorced from
political reality. A reparations figure based on a realistic assessment of
Germany’s capacity to pay would have been too low for either French or
British public opinion to accept. Clemenceau therefore agreed with Lloyd
George to delay calculation of the final sum until 1921.121 A Reparations
Commission was created to determine Germany’s total liability by 1921. In
the interim, the Weimar government would make a payment of 20 billion
gold marks to the Allies. Public expectations at the end of the war made the
question of reparations impossible to resolve in 1919; meanwhile British
policy towards them changed dramatically.122
One issue over which France and Britain shared clear interests was war
debts. Both the British and French delegations argued that servicing the debt
acquired during the war would cripple France, Belgium, and Italy. Britain
had acquired much of this debt on behalf of its Allies during the war. Early
on, the French and Italian delegations suggested that America consider
reapportioning the costs of the war, arguing that it would allow the victors
to moderate their demands for German reparations.123 From within the
Treasury, Keynes, yet to draft his excoriating assessment of French policy,
also proposed a mutualisation of inter-Allied war debts. He warned of the
crushing burden that these obligations would place on European states and
singled out France as a case in point.124
These arguments fell on deaf ears. Wilson’s Administration responded to
pleas for a revision of war debts by threatening to cut off the vital flow of
credit that was keeping European states from economic and social disaster in
1919. It forced Clemenceau to publicly commit that France would honour its
financial obligations.125 Faced with American intransigence, London’s
response was to break ranks. Senior British policy makers began to pursue
an Anglo-American financial entente capable of dictating terms to Britain’s
erstwhile allies. The Cabinet Finance Committee observed, “It is important
that the British Treasury should insist on its position as a fellow creditor with
the United States treasury rather than as a fellow debtor with the French
treasury.”126 The Atlanticist impulse was decisive in undermining British
support for French proposals to create a trans-Atlantic economic and finan-
cial order of the kind that emerged nearly three decades later under very
different geo-political circumstances.
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V
The fate of former German and Ottoman territory caused some of the
bitterest Franco-British disagreements at the Peace Conference. From the
outset, both imperial Powers had to reckon with the implications of both the
Russian revolution and the principle of self-determination for their imperial
aims. Bolshevik success stoked anti-imperialist sentiment across the globe.
Wilson’s war aims, the “Fourteen Points,” were in part a response to this
challenge, the fifth of which stipulated that all colonial adjustments must take
into account “the interests of the population concerned.” Wilson’s
Administration was unequivocal that America had not joined the war to
further the interests of the European empires. The normative context of the
post-war era posed an unmistakeable threat to the legitimacy of European
colonialism.127
The British were ahead of the French in adjusting to the new international
environment. Critics of Imperial rule and advocates of reforming Imperial
practice were more numerous and voluble in Britain than in France. On
5 January 1918, three days before Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” address, Lloyd
George acknowledged that “the separate national conditions” of the Arab
peoples needed recognition. He added, in his “Caxton Hall” address, that the
“wishes and interests” of the population in Germany’s colonies must have
“primary regard” in any peace settlement.128 Not all British officials
embraced this position wholeheartedly. Curzon, a War Cabinet minister
and chair of its powerful “Eastern Committee,” judged that Britain must
“play self-determination for all it is worth, wherever we are involved in
difficulties with the French, the Arabs or anybody else.”129 The British
solution to square aspirations for Imperial expansion with the changed
political context was the mandate system. Selected victorious Powers would
assume responsibility for administering former German and Ottoman imper-
ial territories under a “mandate” from the League.130
French colonial advocates interpreted this system as another example of
Anglo-American collusion at France’s expense—this time depriving France
of the imperial compensations it had earned on the battlefields of Western
Europe. When the first proposals for mandates came before the Council of
Ten, Wilson and Lloyd George were isolated in supporting the idea. Simon
rejected the principle of mandates, arguing in favour of “annexation, pure
and simple.” Only the attribution of imperial sovereignty, he argued, would
induce interested Powers to make investments necessary for “the effective
protection of the natives during the period required for their development
towards a higher plane of civilization.” These long-term aims, Simon assured
the Council, had always been the “higher aspiration” of French
imperialism.131
This ostensibly hard-line approach was almost certainly a negotiating
position. The essential French aim was to ensure the right to recruit colonial
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soldiers from Togoland and Cameroon. Clemenceau cared little and knew
less about France’s imperial interests in this part of the world. His chief
concern was the potential manpower contribution from equatorial Africa to
the future Franco-German military balance. He therefore indicated that his
government was willing to assume these territories as mandates provided it
secured this right. Lloyd George famously agreed on the understanding that
France must not “train big nigger armies for the purposes of aggression.” He
also proposed amendments to the projected mandates system. Colonial
territories earmarked as mandates would be evaluated and placed in different
categories—A, B, and C—according to their supposed level of political and
economic development. Category A mandates were expected to receive self-
rule in the near future, whilst B and C territories would remain under the
tutelage of the relevant “mandatory power” for the foreseeable future. French
negotiators agreed to this compromise on 30 January. France eventually
received most of Cameroon and parts of Togoland as category C mandates,
administering both as traditional colonial possessions through the inter-war
period.132
Syria proved much more difficult. By the time the Peace Conference
opened, Clemenceau had acquired a better grasp of the importance of oil
than had been the case during the London summit in December.133 The
British, meanwhile, were determined to overturn Sykes-Picot altogether.
Curzon’s Eastern Committee, ignoring intelligence assessments to the con-
trary, warned repeatedly that a strong French presence in the Middle East
threatened British communications with India. Needing little convincing,
Lloyd George had developed a genuine enthusiasm for colonial expansion
and a particular fixation with Mesopotamia, Syria, and the Holy Land. The
plan was to use Britain’s military control of the region to force a revision of
the wartime agreement and, as the colonial secretary Lord Milner observed,
to “diddle the French out of Syria.”134 The result was one of the most
rancorous and sustained Franco-British confrontations of the Conference.
Tensions over Syria boiled over during a Council of Four meeting on
20 March. Pichon made the case for a French mandate in Syria based on the
Sykes-Picot agreement stressing France’s “historic rights”: which, he argued,
dated at least to the rule of Louis XIV. Pichon then alluded to the London
meeting on 2 December where Clemenceau agreed to British claims to Mosul
and Palestine. The British government, he noted, had since gone back on this
arrangement, now demanding that France renounce control over nearly the
whole region. This was unacceptable given the tremendous sacrifices that
France had made for common victory on the battlefields of Europe. Lloyd
George responded that a French mandate in Syria would be “in violation of
our bargain with King Hussein.” Pichon responded that Britain neither
consulted nor informed France about this arrangement.135 At issue was
Imperial pre-eminence in the Middle East.
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The deadlock remained unresolved during an especially heated exchange
between Lloyd George and Clemenceau at the Council of Four on 24 March.
“All of this comes from your conversations with Lord Curzon,” Clemenceau
complained. “Curzon is a charming man and very able, but he is hostile to
France.” The French premier observed that his “constant policy” had been
“to preserve the union of France with Great Britain and America.” But giving
up Syria was a concession he could not make. It would cause the fall of his
government and French opinion would turn decisively against Britain and
America. Clemenceau implored Lloyd George not to give the French public
the impression that the Anglo-Americans were colluding to “chase out the
French.” Such a development, he warned, would “produce a reaction in the
French mind” that would “create great difficulties for the world.”136
Wilson’s proposal to form an investigative commission to “discover the
desires of the populations” of Syria and Mesopotamia only partially alleviated
tensions. Duly appointed, the Commission did not leave until the summer and
did not publish its report until 1922. By this time, a series of bilateral agree-
ments between Britain and France settled the question, culminating at the San
Remo Conference of 1920 where the French and British unilaterally awarded
themselves category A mandates in Syria and Mesopotamia. By autumn 1919,
the effort to secure Congressional approval for the Treaty of Versailles con-
sumed the energies of Wilson and his team. Wilson’s absence, interestingly,
induced a more conciliatory stance on the part of Lloyd George’s government.
Its policy of cleaving to America to out-manoeuvre France collapsed in the
wake of American retreat in autumn 1919.137
No other issue in the peace negotiations in Paris emerged as heavily
weighted with the cultural baggage of centuries of Franco-British rivalry as
the extra-European settlement. Even Clemenceau, implacably opposed to
colonial expansion for nearly the whole of his career, found himself drawn
into a confrontation with Britain over France’s imperial rights. The emotive
power of Empire remained irresistible in Great Power negotiations at the
close of the Great War, the colonial settlement in the end a traditional
European imperial arrangement that still reverberates through the Middle
East today.
VI
The French strategy to create a strong group of middle-ranking Powers to
Germany’s east was generally successful despite robust resistance from Lloyd
George over the Polish question. In sub-committees established to consider
the frontiers of the “Successor States,” French officials argued repeatedly that
strategic factors could not be ignored altogether in pursuit of self-
determination.138 Clemenceau took up the same argument in the Council
of Four when it began meeting at the beginning of March: “We must accept
inevitable infringements to the principle of self-determination if we wish to
safeguard the principle itself.”139
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British and American officials once again met privately before attending
multi-lateral sessions concerning Eastern Europe. Neither delegation took
a vibrant interest in the constitution of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Both
of these states-in-the-making possessed nearly all of the territory they wished
to claim when their delegations arrived in Paris. There were misgivings about
the status of ethnic Germans in northern, western, and southern Bohemia.
Czechoslovakia’s frontiers included the German-speaking “Sudetenland”
within its borders. There were also concerns about the situation of non-
Serbs in the new South Slav state. In the end, however, neither the British nor
Americans opposed the establishment of a strong Yugoslavia capable of
forming part of an “eastern barrier” to Germany, whilst at the same time
serving as counter-point to Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean.140
The German-Polish frontier was different. Lloyd George stood strongly
against the reconstitution of a “greater Poland” as recommended by the
Peace Conference sub-commission on this question. He argued that plans
to include more than two million Germans within the new Polish state would
create a “Germania Irredenta,” thus planting “the seed of a future war.” He
questioned whether any of the Allied Great Powers would be “willing to
make war to uphold such a settlement.” The French diplomat, Jules Cambon
—brother of Paul—had chaired the Polish territorial committee. Along with
Clemenceau, he took issue with Lloyd George’s analysis. The French argu-
ment was that the new state must have the resources and communications
network necessary for it to survive.141 A compromise resulted. Poland
received nearly all of Posen—a former Prussian province—and a corridor
to the Baltic Sea separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany. But the
key port city of Danzig was internationalised and placed under League
jurisdiction, and plebiscites were to determine the attribution of the key
strategic area of Marienwerder as well as coal-rich Upper Silesia.142 Poland
nonetheless emerged from the Peace Conference as a major regional Power.
French negotiators were therefore generally successful in their quest to build
a potentially strong anti-German coalition stretching from the Baltic to the
Adriatic.
Settling Germany’s frontiers in the west provoked acute confrontations
between France and both Britain and America. Clemenceau tightly controlled
French policy on this question, with decisive input only from Tardieu and
Aubert. Their strategy was to demand an autonomous Rhineland buffer,
expecting that it would raise British and American objections. French nego-
tiators would then demonstrate flexibility and renounce the demand for
a strategic buffer to secure their ultimate aim: Anglo-American participation
in a trans-Atlantic alliance to protect France from future German aggression.
Repeated references to the importance of political and cultural ties uniting
France, Britain, and America in documentation generated by the French
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Delegation pointed the direction of French policy and the terrain upon which
compromise was expected.
The initial French position was staked out in a memorandum by Marshal
Foch circulated to Allied leaders on 10 January 1919. Foch again proposed
that the Left Bank be reconstituted into one or more neutral states under
permanent Allied and United States occupation, the new polities incorpo-
rated into a common customs regime with the “states of the West” with
which they might eventually opt “to attach themselves as they had in the
past.” Interestingly, however, Tardieu had re-drafted key sections of Foch’s
original version to insert a series of passages emphasising the ideological
affinities of the “states of the west” and the importance of “co-operation
amongst the world’s great democracies.”143 Significantly, Tardieu’s altera-
tions reflected the influence of an earlier note of 2 January in which Aubert
argued that French policy must represent the Rhine as “the natural frontier
between the democracies of the North Atlantic and Germany.”144
Tardieu, together with Aubert, drafted the lengthy “Rhineland memoran-
dum” forwarded as the “definitive statement of France’s policy” to the
Council of Ten on 25 February. The text of this document contains 15
specific references to the “western democracies” as a distinct political and
cultural community. An autonomous Rhineland under Allied occupation
would function as the “frontier of liberty” protecting the “democracies of
the West” from German predations.145 In conversations with British and
American officials, Tardieu stressed the extent to which the Clemenceau
government’s approach differed from former practices. He characterised it
as a “liberal solution” that departed from “traditional solutions of the
past.”146
British officials interpreted French plans to transform the European equi-
librium as incompatible with both Britain’s strategic interests and prospects
for a lasting peace. They had been aware of French plans for the Rhineland
since at least early 1916. Curzon was only the most voluble of a group of
British policy makers who feared a French project to dominate Europe. Lloyd
George’s private secretary, Philip Kerr, urged that France’s Rhineland pro-
gramme be “resisted to the end.” Balfour, criticising French designs on the
Left Bank before the House of Commons in late 1917, lamented that French
policy was inspired by a “lurid picture of Franco-German relations.” What
was needed, he judged in 1919, was a fundamental change in the basis of
international politics:
… if international relations and international methods are, as the French assume,
going to remain in the future what they have been in the past … no manipulation
of the Rhine frontier is going to make France anything more than a second-rate
power, trembling at the nod of its great neighbours to the East and depending
from day to day on the changes and chances of a shifting diplomacy and uncertain
alliances.147
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Lloyd George, for his part, resolved to oppose not only any alteration to the
status of the Left Bank, but also any Allied occupation of that territory.
Moreover, he was convinced that Clemenceau’s government could be per-
suaded to renounce its position by the right inducements from London and
Washington.
The prime minister’s conviction was well founded. Whilst the “Rhineland
memorandum” was France’s official negotiating position, Clemenceau and
his team doubted that it could be sustained in the negotiations to come. They
remained highly sceptical of military intelligence reports that Rhinelanders
desired a closer relationship with France. Tardieu and Aubert pointed to
other evidence suggesting strongly that the region’s population overwhel-
mingly considered itself German and saw its future with the Reich rather
than with France.148 Aubert outlined the implications of this state of affairs
for French policy during the first days of March 1919. He began by obser-
ving, “[m]oral arguments based on self-determination have little force in
relation to the immediate status of the Rhineland.”149 He then cast further
doubt on the power of the French case, emphasising that post-Armistice
Germany was militarily weak and mired in political chaos. “We must recog-
nise,” Aubert began,
that for the moment the danger of a resurgence of the German peril is assuming an
ever more academic character that does not justify great political decisions such as
the permanent detachment of five million Germans on the Left Bank.
He then observed, crucially, “Our allies can, with a strong case, offer us
a substitute in the form of an alliance.” If such an offer arose, he advised,
French negotiators “would be wise to acknowledge the temporary character
of our case for a watch on the Rhine … and argue instead for an occupation
lasting as long as Germany remains a threat.” Aubert submitted that
a strategic commitment from Britain and America was preferable to political
isolation that would come with a permanent occupation of an autonomous
Rhineland.
Aubert’s analysis reflected thinking within Clemenceau’s inner circle. The
premier and his advisors anticipated that Britain and America would offer
France a military commitment of some kind. What is more, they dropped
clear hints that such an offer would find favour. In early December, Jean
Monnet, Clemenceau’s protégé at the Commerce Ministry posted to London,
intimated to an American Treasury official that France would make extensive
territorial demands unless it received some sort of Anglo-American guaran-
tee against a future German attack.150 In conversations with British delegates
at the end of February, Tardieu made clear that his government was “ready to
consider anything which the Allies thought reasonable.” The crucial consid-
eration was closing the Left Bank for all time to the German military.151
Tardieu went even further in conversations with House on 23 February,
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suggesting that an Allied occupation of the Rhineland need not be perma-
nent. He declared that there would be no necessity for such a regime if
Germany did not pose a threat “in five, ten or some other number of
years.”152 He offered the same set of observations to British and American
officials, Kerr and Sidney Mezes, on 11 and 12 March.153 Tardieu subse-
quently admitted to French parliamentary officials that the “Rhineland
memorandum” had been an “instrument of discussion” prepared under
circumstances in which “France had no peacetime commitment from its
allies.”154
These various hints convinced Lloyd George that Clemenceau’s govern-
ment was “not really behind” its Rhineland proposal.155 His Cabinet agreed
to propose joint Anglo-American military guarantees as substitutes for
French demands for a strategic Rhineland buffer. Wilson, who would have
been receiving similar information from Tardieu’s American interlocutors,
accepted the idea of a joint Anglo-American offer of military assistance in the
event of unprovoked aggression. The offer was made to Clemenceau on
14 March. The French anticipated such an offer and responded quickly.
“We must choose,” Clemenceau stated in meeting with his inner circle on
that evening, “either France alone on the Left Bank” or “America and Britain
allied to us.” By the following morning, all agreed that the guarantee offer
was impossible to refuse.156 It seemed that the Clemenceau government had
achieved its aim of a North Atlantic alliance including Britain and America.
The Anglo-American guarantee offer was highly innovative and marked
a dramatic departure from long-standing traditions in British foreign policy.
Lloyd George later specified that Britain would “place all our forces at
[France’s] disposal” in the event of unprovoked German aggression. He
further undertook to begin construction of a Channel Tunnel to expedite
military assistance.157 Tough negotiations remained. Tardieu and Pichon
drafted a note accepting the Anglo-American proposition but demanded
a range of supplementary guarantees including a thirty-year occupation,
a link between the occupation and reparations payments, and the permanent
demilitarisation of the Left Bank as well as a 50 kilometre-wide strip of
territory on the Right Bank. The final details of the proposed guarantee
treaty were not finalised for another month.158
VII
It was at this point, in the midst of talks over the details of the guarantee,
that Lloyd George professed to have second thoughts about the entire nature
of the settlement with Germany. On 22 March, he invited several of his
closest advisors to join him at Fontainebleau, near Paris. The purpose was to
reflect on the terms that were emerging and outline a coherent British
position. The result was the “Fontainebleau Memorandum,” distributed to
the Council of Four on 25 March. The document was a sustained plea for
more lenient terms for Germany. It warned that the German population
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would not accept a harsh peace and predicted its leaders would refuse to sign
the treaty as it was taking shape. It also argued against a punitive economic
regime for Germany and, in contrast to the position the British had taken in
February, now rejected a reparations settlement that would punish future
generations for Germany’s role in the war. A harsh settlement would render
Germany vulnerable to the siren call of Bolshevik revolution. Finally, the
Memorandum warned against territorial adjustments that left large numbers
of Germans under Polish or Czechoslovak rule. It concluded by warning that
the punishing peace envisaged by the Allies would be very difficult to enforce
and sow the seeds of future conflict.159
The British position provoked a robust French reaction. Tardieu drafted
the official response. Arguing that the British exaggerated the danger of
the Germans not signing the peace treaty, he also underlined the hypoc-
risy in the British position. Britain had already obtained its core strategic
aims: Germany’s High Seas fleet scuttled, its colonies occupied, and much
of its merchant fleet handed over to the British. Germany’s strategic
advantages over France, meanwhile, remained intact. “This fact seems to
have escaped M. Lloyd George’s analysis,” Tardieu observed. Germany’s
enduring industrial and demographic advantage underpinned the need for
viable states to Germany’s east. These “new states” must be capable of
resisting the spread of Bolshevism whilst providing counter-weight to
German military potential.160 Clemenceau took these arguments up in
a sharp exchange with Lloyd George in the Council of Four on
27 March.161
The most significant short-term impact of the Fontainebleau
Memorandum was the adjustment of the proposed German-Polish frontier.
In the longer term, however, the Memorandum illuminated the divergent
political and strategic perspectives of the British and French policy establish-
ments for all to see. It also underlined Lloyd George’s ambiguous attitude
towards France and French security. The premier, and too many other key
British officials, failed to understand that any French predominance in
Europe at this juncture was artificial and temporary. He aimed to use
France’s desire for post-war British support as leverage to compel a more
moderate French policy towards Germany. The guarantee offer needs under-
standing in this context. It was a lever for influence over French policy rather
than an ironclad commitment to preserve France’s security. This was why
Lloyd George insisted, successfully, that Britain’s guarantee was conditional
on American involvement. Antony Lentin has argued that the British prime
minister assumed all along that the American Congress would refuse to ratify
their guarantee and Britain would retain its entire freedom of action.162
Whatever the case, there can be no mistaking Lloyd George’s growing resolve
to distance Britain from questions of European security.
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There was no such ambiguity on the part of the French government.
Clemenceau invested massive political capital in his effort to sell the benefits
of the Anglo-American guarantee to his compatriots. In doing so, he had to
face down open insubordination on the part of Foch, a subversive political
campaign to overthrow him by Poincaré, and sustained resistance in
Parliament and the press through their parliamentary allies. All argued that
the Anglo-American guarantees could never replace a permanent position on
the Rhine as a reliable foundation of France’s security. In making the case for
his programme in summer and autumn 1919, both Clemenceau and Tardieu
stressed repeatedly that only a trans-Atlantic strategic community of demo-
cratic Great Powers would be potent enough to enmesh and constrain
German power in the end.163 History would demonstrate the merits of this
argument. Yet there can be no denying that it rested on a misreading of both
the United States and Britain’s willingness to commit to uphold security on
the European continent.
As the Paris Peace Conference ended, the Franco-British entente was
already fraying badly. The entente that had weathered the test of war on an
unprecedented scale proved unable to cope with the challenges of forging
peace. The inescapable conclusion is that Britain was much more important
to France in 1919 than France to Britain. Clemenceau’s government put aside
the cultural baggage of centuries of Franco-British rivalry to attribute
a pivotal role to Britain in its planning for post-war peace and security.
This policy orientation had strong roots in the pre-war diplomacy of
Théophile Delcassé, resting on ideological considerations as well as calcula-
tions of the future balance of power. “With its navy, its military potential, its
immense economic resources and especially its political culture and fidelity
to engagements,” observed the French ambassador in London, “Britain is as
precious an ally in war-time as its political influence, moral authority and
loyalty make it in peace-time.”164 And it endured despite repeated rebuffs
from British negotiators as well as persistent evidence of Anglo-American
collusion over core issues such as the League, economic security, and Eastern
Europe frontiers. Clemenceau’s government remained firm that only close
co-operation amongst the three great Atlantic democracies could establish
a security system capable of containing and enmeshing Germany.
But by the post-armistice period the priorities of the Lloyd George govern-
ment were already shifting away from the European continent and toward
the Empire. The cultural reflexes of British policy elites reasserted themselves
with alarming speed as the Great War drew to an unexpected close, with
France once again viewed as a chief rival to Britain’s global interests. This
was particularly the case when it came to British aspirations to dominate the
Middle East after the collapse of Ottoman power. The Empire shaped the way
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British policy makers understood Britain’s role in the world and the way they
interpreted its vital interests.
France’s peace strategy therefore foundered on the shoals of British refusal
to uphold the European settlement without full American participation. The
re-emergence of Britain’s traditional ambiguity concerning continental affairs
should not have surprised policy makers in Paris. The Clemenceau govern-
ment’s concept of a trans-Atlantic security system was ahead of its time. It
would take another World War of even greater destructiveness to convince
both British and American policy elites of the importance of a strategic
commitment on the European continent.
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